Abstract: This paper is devoted to the presentation of a risk-management methodology specifically developed for assessing and analysing risks incurred by the business transactions of an organisation. A transaction is a part of a business information system that has one or other functional goal. An order-entry-and-delivering-ofgoods transaction forming part of an MRP (materials, requirement & planning) information system is discussed as an example. The proposed methodology includes five successive stages in all, namely initiation, domain analysis, risk assessment, risk analysis and domain monitoring. This paper focuses on the risk analysis stage.
INTRODUCTION
Information technology is currently being employed in business environments across the globe, resulting in significant improvements in the efficiency and quality of all services rendered. The occurrence of a risk, such as the exposure of highly confidential and sensitive transaction data to outsiders, could compromise not only the customer's privacy, but also quite literally the well-being of the organisation. It is, imperative, therefore, to be able to identify possible risks in good time and to implement the necessary security controls in order to protect the business as a whole.
Broadly speaking, risk management can be defined as that process by means of which security controls are identified and implemented that will, at best, prevent risks from occurring and, at worst, minimise their effect if they were to occur [1] [2] [3] . In currently available risk-management techniques the emphasis has, however, mainly been placed on the input and manipulation of numbers. Human common sense and intuition, which form the basis of any risk-management exercise, are most of the time neglected. These techniques, furthermore, address risk analysis f rom an information-and resources-asset point of view. They require organisations to identify all assets, followed by the identification of the applicable risks. Risks identified in such a way are not modelled from a business point of view. Management might be interested to know what risks are involved during the execution of a specific type of business transaction. It is, therefore, essential to protect the transaction as a basic business unit.
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The principal aim of this paper is, therefore, not to discourage the use of powerful risk-management techniques (such as CRAMM), but rather to propose a new way of handling risk management in an integrated business environment. The methodology incorporates both the vague and intuitive aspects of the normal busines s environment by following a cognitive fuzzylogic approach to the assessment and analysis of risks that might be incurred in this environment. The methodology is aimed at identifying the high-risk areas within a typical business environment. The methodology also helps to manage risks by facilitating the decision-making process with respect to securing information assets.
The proposed methodology includes five successive stages in all, namely initiation, domain analysis, risk assessment, risk analysis and domain monitoring. The first section of the paper will be devoted to a synoptic and high-level overview of the proposed methodology, followed by an in-depth discussion on the risk analysis stage. route that a transaction follows will further on be referred to as a transaction information route.
A HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED

RISK-MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY
Transaction information routes indicate and identify all management
processes and IT components that are required for the successful execution of a transaction. A transaction information route is used to assess and analyse the risks from an information security perspective. The advantage of performing risk analysis in this way is that composite risks from a business point of view can be calculated. During the first stage (viz. initiation), the scope of the required riskmanagement project needs to be determined. The scope will on a high level identify the business transactions, also referred to as transaction information routes, that are of most importance to the organisation. 
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The technologies and management processes employed in each phase to store and process transaction based information and the security controls implemented are not fixed, in the sense that the technologies and procedures can be upgraded and new security controls might be implemented over time.
These technologies and procedures do not, however, exist in isolation. They interact and, in this way, exert a distinct influence on the possibility of risks incurring in an organisation. The more access capabilities and privileges defined for a transaction in a certain phase along a transaction information route, the greater the likelihood, for example, of the transaction's information being exposed to unauthorised parties. The risk management methodology proposed in this paper, therefore, considers not only the technologies and procedures that interact, but also their relationships with each other and their effect on the likelihood of IT risks being incurred.
The principal aim of the third stage (viz. risk-assessment) is to determine a risk value for each phase in a transaction information route.
This risk value is based on the information-technology domain, including technology and management processes, of a transaction's information route.
A cognitive fuzzy-modelling approach is followed to calculate risk values for each phase of a transaction information route. This approach ensures that full cognisance be taken of human common sense and intuition during the assessment and analysis of risks. As a detailed explanation of the cognitive fuzzy-modelling approach, for the risk assessment phase, falls outside the scope of this paper, the reader is referred to [4] for more information on this approach.
During the fourth stage (viz. risk analysis) decisions are made regarding the risk values calculated in the previous stage (that is, the risk-assessment stage). The risk-analysis stage is aimed at identifying high-risk transaction information routes (that is, critical transaction information routes) in a typical business environment with a view to enhancing the information
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7 security of such organization. The argumentation is that if management addresses the security problems exerted by the critical transaction information routes, the security issues in the less critical routes will also be addressed. This stage will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 3.
Finally, the organisation must be monitored during the fifth stage (viz.
domain monitoring) in order to pinpoint any changes in its dynamic nature, including new risks that might occur. The latter stage, however, constitutes an ongoing process through which further or new risks could be identified that might even require a partial or complete iteration of the current riskmanagement methodology.
STAGE 4: RISK ANALYSIS
The activities to be performed during the risk-analysis stage are depicted in figure 3. During the risk-analysis stage, decisions are made regarding the risk values calculated for each phase along a specific transaction information route during the previous stage (that is, the risk-assessment stage). A phase could be classified as a "low-risk" phase if its risk value were to fall between 0 and 350, as a "medium-risk" phase if its risk value were to fall between 8
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351 and 650 or as a "high-risk" phase, if its risk value were to fall between 651 and 1000. The latter classification is based on a numeric scale ranging from 0 to 1000, with 1000 representing the highest possible risk value. The phases classified as "high-risk" phases give cause for concern.
The risk-analysis stage is a imed at identifying high-risk transaction information routes (that is, critical transaction information routes) in an organization with a view to enhancing the information security of such organization. 2)
The present methodology proposes a set of heuristics, summarised in table 1, for aggregating the risk values for all the phases along a specific transaction information route. 
increase the number of employees and allocate advanced access rights, such as append and delete, poor password management is critical and increase the risk significantly. The FCM implements this as follows: In order for C 4, poor password management, to be triggered, the incoming relationships must be aggregated to a minimum of 0.8, that is, 80%. If, for example, the level of access privileges for obtaining access to the transaction were to increase (C2) and an increasing number of employees were to share the transaction information (C 1 ), then the incoming relationships (e 1 ,e 4 ) and (e 2 ,e 4 ) need to aggregate to at least 0.8 in order for the "poor password management" (C 4 )
issue to be triggered. The thresholds of the other issues are determined in the same way. Like the strengths of the relationships between issues, the trigger thresholds are also determined in an intuitive manner.
Construct edge matrices for the FCMs (Stage 4 task 4.3)
A simple two-dimensional edge matrix can be used to represent the strengths of the relationships between issues. Following, an example of an edge matrix in figure 5: Figure 5 . An edge matrix representing the strengths of the relationships between the various issues that take place during a critical phase (order entry)
The i th row lists the connection strength of the edges (e i ,e k ) directed out from issue C i . The first row in the matrix indicates, for example, that the strength of the relationship (e1,e3) between C 1 ("Number of employees sharing information in this phase") and C 3 ("exposure of database files") is 0.6, that the strength of (e1,e4) between C 1 and C 4 ("Poor password management") is 0.8 and that the strength of (e 1 ,e 6 ) between C 1 and C6 is 0.8.
Furthermore, C i causally increases C k if (e i ,e k ) > 0, decreases C k if (e i ,e k ) < 0 and has no effect if (e i ,e k ) = 0. Event C 1 ("Number of employees sharing information in this phase"), for example, causally increases events C 3 ("exposure of database files"), C 4 ("Poor password management") and C 6 ("risk of transaction information being exposed") to varying degrees, because (e 1 ,e 3 ), (e 1 ,e 4 ) and (e 1 ,e 6 ) are allgreater than 0.
Construct "What-if scenarios" (Stage 4 task 4.3)
The edge matrix of the FCM can be used to explore various "What-if" scenarios in order to determine a way in which either to decrease such risk value or to explore whether or not a certain scenario would increase the risk value. What would happen if, for instance, poor password management becomes a problem? "What-if" scenarios such as these need to be constructed for this purpose.
Supposing that the IT risk value for a certain phase was calculated at 450
(on a scale of 0 to 1 000). Each issue in an FCM triggers one or more other issues on (1) or off (0). In order, for example, to model the "What-if"
scenario, namely what would happen if, for instance, poor password management becomes a problem, event C 4 ("Poor password
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management") needs to be turned on, that is, to be set equal to 1. All other 
This results in C 6 remaining on. The next input state I 2 = [0 0 0 1 0 1] is, therefore, equal to the previous input state I 1 . For this reason, the FCM converges to a fixed point I 2 that turns on C 6 ("the risk of transaction information being exposed"). This means that " Poor password management" in the order entry phase would increase the risk of transaction information being exposed (C 6 ).
The reader is referred to [6] for more information on this technique.
The foregoing example illustrates how an edge matrix constructed from an FCM can be used to explore "What-if" scenarios. Before the necessary security controls could be implemented, however, a report would have to be compiled in order to verify the need for such controls. The report mus t then be submitted to management in order to obtain its approval of the proposed security controls.
Devise a project plan (stage 4 task 4.6)
Only after management has approved the said report could a project plan be devised.
CONCLUSION
This paper has been devoted to the presentation of a risk-management methodology specifically developed for assessing and analysing risks incurred by the business transactions of an organisation. The aim of the methodology is to enhance risk management by following a cognitive fuzzy approach to the assessment and analysis of risks. The advantage of using this approach is that the intuitive nature of human observation, which forms the basis of any risk assessment, and the vagueness regarding the decision-making process with respect to securing transaction information, are both taken into account when assessing and analysing IT risks.
The risk-analysis (fourth) stage of the methodology has been discussed in detail in this paper. The principal aim of this stage was to help manage risks by facilitating the decision-making process. This was achieved by first identifying the critical phases (that is, the high-risk phases) along each transaction information route by using the risk values calculated for each phase during the risk-assessment stage. Having identified these critical phases, the critical transaction information routes (high-risk transaction information routes) could be identified by aggregating the risk values of all phases comprising the specific transaction information route. In this way, the high-risk areas in an organisation can be pinpointed.
Furthermore, the cognitive fuzzy-modelling approach followed by the proposed methodology also enables the investigation of these critical areas with a view to enhancing the level of information security. This is achieved by making use of an FCM and by constructing various "What-if" scenarios to determine which of them might lead to the increase/decrease of a risk incidence. In this way, the decision-making process with respect to enhancing the overall information security is facilitated.
We aim our further research at developing a prototype to illustrate the functioning of the risk analysis stage and to prove that the model is not merely a theoretical concept, but that it can indeed be implemented successfully.
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